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Problem*--The problem in tills study is to examine the concept of civil
disobedience in contemporary democratic thought with special reference to
Henry David Thoreau, Hahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King* Jr.
Scope.—This study is concerned specifically with two claims to the
right of civil disobedience in a democratic states (1) that there are certain
inalienable rights of man and the right to obey conscience over positive
law is such a right, and (2) that the State is in principle or practice
supporting an unjust and evil system of laws and the individual citizen has
a right to reject them through nonviolent civil disobedience*
Significance. —The information found in this paper should illuminate the
persistent problems of civil disobedience and situations resulting from the
attempted correction or resolution of the conflict between political authority
and individual freedom, State and conscience* Further, it should provide
useful reference for those Interested in evaluating and gaining a more thorough
understanding of the techniques and philosophies Involved in the nonviolent
resistance movements of this age*
Procedure. —Reference to the classic expressions of nonviolent civil
disobedience by Antigone and Socrates as historical background is made in
order to throw some light upon the present situation* The philosophies of
Thomas Aquinas and Hugh of Fleury of the Medieval age are also used for intro
ductory purposes* However, only the contributions of Henry David Thoreau,
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Mahatma Gandhi and Martin lather King, Jr., are subjected to analysis and
criticism because they are three of the foremost exponents of civil dis
obedience in contemporary democratic thought*
The conflict between individual freedom and political authority has
long posed a problem for mankind* Observe its relation to the perennial
encounter between Christians and States* Today, as in earlier times, govern
ments and citizens still contend over the old and fundamental problems of
political obligation* There are those who, like Hegel, categorically assert
that it is the duty of the individual always to obey the state, while others,
like Thoreau, insist that a citizen owes his primary obligation to his own
conscience* There seems sometimes to exist a yawning chasm between the minds
of the keepers of law and recalcitrant individuals* There continues a search
for a solution to the problem* However, the outlook is not reassuring*
From the tragic experiences of early and modern history, men have learned
a simple, yet crucial truths that positive law and the consciences of some
men have been in conflict* In the history of ideas—as well as in the history
of political insitutions—some individuals have sought relief from what has
been termed the menacing, oppressive power of the State* various methods
have been employed to impose restrictions on the exercise of coercive authority*
From a variety of motives and for different ideas and ideals, men have
attacked certain forms of subjection of man to the State* The philosophies
Involved in their positions and the attitudes and patterns of nonconformity
are the subject matter of this work*
In the West, civil disobedience, which is the direct contravention of
specific laws and may include such activities as the non-payment of taxes and
jail-going, is a familiar, if unpopular, concept* It is the child of the
conflict between individual freedom and authority. The post-war years in
America have witnessed a revival of the debate over the source and meaning
of political obligation* The death of Socrates, the dilemma of Antigone,
the action of Thoreau—these highlights in the course of man's reflection
upon the problem of obligation—dignify arguments concerning the conscientious
objector's position in the contemporary circumstance, or the refusal of a
witness to testify before an American Congressional investigative committee*
Civil disobedience has usually been understood to be an individual considera
tion* It has meant resistance or refusal to obey agton law, usually on the
ground that such a law offends the individual's conscience or is repugnant
to a "higher law" to which the individual owes prior allegiance* The prob
lem has been one of competing, conflicting moral values, and the solution
has appeared to rest-»necessarily, but also uneasily—with the individual.2
Civil disobedience, as a technique for relieving the pressures of govern*
ment on the individual, is ancient* In its extreme form, it involves, ac
cording to some, the right to kiU a tyrant.3 This right was clearly stated
in the eleventh century by Manegold of Lautenbach who pointed out that the
essence of the kingship is the office and not the person; hence, the indi
vidual's right to the office cannot be indefeasible*b Manegold used this
principle to show that tyrannicide could be justified when a king has de-
Jean Bondurant, The Conquest of Violence (Princeton, 1958), p* 3*
2Ibid»
Neuman, The Authoritarian and Democratic State (Chicago, 19!>7),
sorge H. Sabine, A History of Political Thought (3rd ed. 5 New York,
1961), p. 210*
stroyed those goods which the office was instituted to preserve and refuses
to relinquish tine position upon the request of the ruled* He thus arrived
at a comparatively definite theory of contract (pactum) between the king and
the people* And in the twelfth century, John of Salisbury developed a theory
of tyrannicide.5 However, it is not the intention of the writer to deal with
the extreme form of civil disobedience, but rather, the most recurring facet,
nonviolent resistance*
Methodologically, the classic expressions of nonviolent civil disobedience
of Antigone and Socrates are discussed as historical sketches* Similarly,
the medieval concepts of St. Thomas Aquinas and Hugh of Floury are treated*
However, only the contributions of the modern exponents, Henry D* Thoreau,
Mahatma Gandhi, and Martin Luther King, Jr., are placed under analysis and
criticism because it is within these minds that the philosophy for the con
tinuous search for individual freedom and dignity in contemporary democratic
thought has been formulated*
Since it is the general conviction of this writer, with David Spitz and
Aristotle, that "in all disputes upon government, each party says something
that is just," a consideration of those principles which, in a democratic
State, are argued as claims to the right of civil disobedience, is given*
Of such appeals to the right of civil disobedience, the scope of this
paper is limited to two: (1) the right to disobey unjust laws because the
system is, in principle or practice, unjust and (2) the natural right to obey
one's conscience over positive law*
^Cited by David Spita in "Democracy and the Problem of Civil Disobedience,"
Political Science Review. XLVII (April, 1#U), 2078.
Since the resolution of a problem first requires that the problem be
understood, it may be wen to state at the outset what is conceived, by this
writer, to be the underlying questions emerging from civil disobedience* At
the present time there exists a grave dilemma for mankind. It is found that
if one obeys the state, in certain instances, he violates his moral code.
On the other hand if he obeys his conscience, he violates the law. What,
then, should the individual do? Should he obey the State and spare himself
the humiliating and sometimes extremely bitter consequences of not having
complied with the law, or should he passively and wilfully disobey and have
only the consolation of knowing that he displayed moral courage? Or again,
the position of Thoreau, that "under a government which imprisons any unjustly,
the true place for a just man is also a prison,"7 These are questions which,
when leveled at the State's adamance, uncover man*s great dilemma.
Historical Sketches
Antigone
A classic expression of nonviolent civU disobedience is the case of
Antigone, Antigone was torn between two loyalties. Her religion commanded
her to bury the body of her brother, Polyneices, while her State commanded
her to leave his body, unburied and unmoumed, to be eaten by dogs and vul
tures on the open range outside the city walls. As a loyal citizen, Antigone
was required to yield her conscience to the law of the state, to guide her
conduet by the precepts of law. As a person bound to her kin by the dictates
of her religion, she was required to subordinate the instructions of Creon,
Henry David Thoreau, "Civil Disobedience," Philosopher of Freedom, ed,
James MacEaye (Boston, 193U), p. 13lu r ""




Antigone buried Polyneices, her brother, against the win of the State,
To be sure, wilful disobedience to laws of the State was questionable in her
case, but then, so were the drastic measures used by the King. There is no
evidence that there were any all-wise, unerring human beings living during
that time. So, there was a great possibility of error in Creon's judgment,
but his position, as he saw it, gave him the power to render the verdict and
penalty since there was no higher earthly authority to restrain him.
The adamance of the King and the behavior of Antigone have prompted many
theorists to ponder the questions: (1) When, if ever, should a Jaw be dis
obeyed? and (2) Does the individual have the right to apply a moral and con
science check on what he views as wilful and flagrant maladministration of
the law?
In Antigone's case, the King believed that the individual had no right
to disobey the law under any circumstances and stated that he %ould not
tolerate lawbreakers or critics of the government. TiJhoever is chosen to govern
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should be obeyed in all things, great and small, just and unjust.n7 Antigone
acted contrarily because, in her words?
It was not God's proclamation. That Final justice that rules
the world below, makes no such laws. Your edict, King, was
strong, but all your strength is weakness itself against the
immortal unrecorded laws of God. They are not merely now:
%obert Tfl/hitelaw (ed.), "Antigone," Sophocles (New York, ±9Qk), p. U2.
9
Ibid., p. U6.
they are and were and shall be operative forever beyond
men utterly.10
This, then, is the heart of Antigone's resistance, Antigone was not a
philosopher. She had no systematic theory of resistance to government. Like
wise, since the ancient age was greatly different from today, there was no
legal recourse. The King's word was law, but that did not solve the moral
problem.
Socrates
Another momentous situation of the conflict between the sovereign and
the subject in history is that of Socrates. Here, again, is a situation which
has presented and still presents challenging questions for political theorists.
In this case, Socrates resisted the state in that he refused to refrain from
his "search of the mysteries of life, and philosophy11 because, "God has com
manded me to do so.*11 Socrates was attacked by Meletus, Anytus and Iycon
on the ground that he was an abominable fellow who corrupted young men, in
vestigated things in the air and under the earth, and taught people to dis
believe in the gods. Further, it was alleged that he made the worse appear
the better reason.12 Socrates thought the charges were unjust, unwise and
ridiculous. Therefore, he refused to, as he uttered it, "plead before you
as you would have me plead, to appear before you with weeping and wailing,
or say and do many other things, which I maintain are unworthy of me, but
which you have been accustomed to from other
1QIbid.
^ Montgomery, Socrates vs. the State (Boston, 195U), p» 138.
13A. £• Taylor, Socrates (New York, 1933), p. Uu
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Commentary
A student of political science might attempt to examine the situation
concerning Socrates by posing a question such as, does the individual have
the right to disobey laws of a state simply because he does not agree with a
specific law? It is obvious that Socrates had some very strong ideas about
bis personal rights* In his memorable speech to the judges, he declared:
If you were to say to me, •Socrates, this time we will not
listen to Anytusj we will let you go; but on this condition
that you cease from your search, and from philosophy; if you
are found following those pursuits again, you shall diet* I
say, if you offered to let me go on these terms, I should
reply:—Athenians, I hold you in the highest regard and love
but I will obey God rather than youj and as long as I have
breath and strength, I will not cease from philosophy and
from exhorting you, and declaring the truth to everyone of
you whom I meet* For, know well, God has commanded me to
do so*1**
Clearly, in this testimony, Socrates observes the right to break the
laws of the State* His reasons are identified with the will of God* He
chose to obey the "divine voice" or the "sign of God" which, he said, guided
him all through his life, rather than the decision of -foe State.*&
St. Thomas Aquinas
Although there were beliefs and activities to the contrary, the situation
existing in the Medieval period, for the most part, was different* The people
began to encourage examination of the foundation of secular authority* This
problem was clearly involved in the attempt of Gregory 711 to depose the
emperor, Henry 17. It was the Medieval belief that law and government should
p* 18*
always be contributory to justice. Therefore, both monarch and community
were •♦subjects'* of political rights and duties, and it was only ia the union
of the two that the organic whole consisted* Moreover, in the community, all
the individuals stood ia legal relationship to the monarch* Lordship,
therefore, was never mere right; primarily it was a duty; it was a divine,
but for that reason a more onerous, calling; it was a public office, a service
rendered to the whole body*17 Evidence of this relationship can be found la
Manegold Lautenbach's theory of contract* R* W. Carlyle found thatt
No man can make himself emperor or king; a people sets a man
over it to the end that he may rule justly, giving to every
man his own, aiding good men and coercing bad, in short, that
he may give justice to all men. If then he violates the agree
ment according to which he was chosen, disturbing and confounding
the very things which he was meant to put in order, reason
dictates that he absolves the people from their obedience,
especially when he has himself first broken the faith which
bound him and the people together.18
It was believed, duriag this period, and advocated strongly by St. Thomas
Aquinas, that rulers were instituted for the sake of the people, not the people
for the sake of the rulers* Therefore, the power of the ruler was not abso
lute, but limited by appointed bounds. His task was to further the common
weal, peace and justice, and the utmost freedom for all. In every breach of
these duties and every transgression of the bounds that they set, accordiag
to Aquinas, legitimate lordships degenerate into tyranny.19 Aquinas, according
Oeorge H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory (New York, 1937), p* 2liO*
17
'Otto Oierke, Political Theories of the Middle Ages, trans. Frederic
William Maitland (Cambridge, 1950), p. 3U.
13
Cited by Sabine, op. cit*. (3rd ed«; New York, 1961), p. 21a*
X*Gierke, op, cit,, p. 35.
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to Sabine, held that the moral purpose fpr which political rule exists implies
that authority should be limited and that it should be exercised only in
accordance with law. Aquinas' dislike of tyranny was as great as that dis
played by John of Salisbury, though he explicitly disavowed the latter>s
defense of tyrannicide* Justifiable resistance is a public act of a whole
people, and the right is safeguarded by the moral condition that those who
resist are responsible for seeing that their action is less injurious to the
general good than the abuse which they are trying to remove.20 st. Thomas
was essentially interested in the moral limitations laid upon the rulers,
and the legal or constitutional phases of the subject seemed not to have con
cerned him, according to Sabine's interpretation.
Sabine states that St* Thomas saw rulersbip as an office or a trust for
the whole community. Idke his lowest subject, the ruler was justified in all
that he did solely because he contributed to the common good* His power,
because it was derived from God for the happy ordering of human life, was a
ministry or service owed to the community of which he was the head* He could
not rightfully exercise power or take property by taxation beyond what was
needed* Broadly speaking, it was the duty of the ruler to direct the action
of every class in the State so that men could live a happy and virtuous life,
which is the true end of man in society.21
Commentary
St. Thomas was explicit on the point that a king's power should be
20
Sabine, op. cit.« (3rd ed.j New York, 1961), p. 21*9,
21lbid., p. 251.
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"limited," though he neglected to explain exactly what tills meant. It is
probably safe to assume, like Sabine, that he had in mind the idea that the
ruler could not rightfully exercise power or take property by taxation beyond
what was needed*
Thomas Aquinas was explicit also on the point that true government, as
distinguished from tyranny, was "lawful,11 but he did not spell out precisely
what lawful authority meant in this connection* Though he was acquainted
with the Roman law, he did not make use of it to recognize the tendency to
exalt the power of a sovereign ruler over the law itself* In his treatment
of tyranny* he referred to two remedies which are available against tyrants*
There were, he assumed, governments in which the ruler's power was derived
from the people, and 1a this ease it was lawful for the people to enforce
the conditions upon which the ruler*s power was granted* The other remedy
mentioned was in the case of a ruler who had a political superior, and here
the redress of grievances was by an appeal to that superior*
Hugh of Flettry
Along the lines of individual rights and their relationships to rulers,
Hugh of Fleury, a keen student of rights and duties during the Medieval period,
advanced an interesting theory* He held that the individual, in opposition
to the claims of tyrannical rulers, should be allowed only the right and
duty of a martyr's "passive resistance*"" He therefore prescribed that
the ruler be tolerated and prayed for, but that commands which contravene the
law of God be disobeyed, and that punishment and death be borne in the martyr's
spirit*23




Despite the modesty of Hugh of Fleury's contribution to medieval politi
cal theory, he anticipated the modern methodology utilissed by individuals to
be examined later in this paper* He asserted that a recalcitrant individual
is exposed to severe penalty at the discretion of the ruler* His theory
suggests passive resistance to unjust law, but it does not suggest proteetive
measures during the act of civil disobedience* In fact, Hugh of Fleury was
perhaps among the first political theorists to glorify death as good reward




In the nineteenth century, one school of thought elaborated a denuncia
tion of the United States government—on the ground of its violation, through
slavery, of man's natural right "to his own body" and the fruits "of his own
labor"—into a condemnation of all government as based essentially on vio
lence. Several men preached "non-resistance" in the form of a refusal to
take any part in government or to countenance the use of force either in
support of or against it. According to Coker, Henry David Thoreau believed
in man's natural impulse to goodness and in his perfectibility under the
guidance of his free and reasonable will. In Thoreau, perhaps, lies the
fullest appeal to individuality and nonconformity in a civilization which
was increasingly giving way to orthodoxy and social compulsion. He argued
for the supremacy, under all conditions, of conscience over the law. He
believed and demonstrated by example that, if government, responding to ex
pediency or majority pressures, infringes upon the fundamental freedom of
the individual or the minority, the remedy is nonviolent, or pacific, resistance.
Thoreau was only incidentally interested in politics. However, like
many of his Concord friends, he became greatly disturbed over the slavery
issue. Opposed to slavery, he became doubly incensed over the course of politics
which led to war with Mexico in 18U8. His protest against these two evils
is found in "Civil Disobedience," probably his most Important political writing.




In this work, he stated his case for the refusal of moral men to obey the
edicts of tiie State. His basic approach is indicated in the opening sentences
of his work:
I heartily- accept the motto, 'That government is best which
governs least;• and I should like to see it acted up to more
rapidly and systematically. Carried out, it finally amounts
to this, nhich also I believe,—»Ihat government is best
which governs not at all;1 and when men are prepared for it
that will be the kind of government which they will have.
According to Alan P. Grimes, in his American Political Thought. Thoreau
was not, as he is sometimes considered to be, an anarchist* He did not wish
to abolish government even though he did advocate resistance to what he believed
to be bad government. He wished to eliminate force as an instrument of govern
ment, but to do this he realized the prior necessity of eliminating those
conditions which made the use of force necessary. He wished to help prepare
man for that happy society in itoieh each man would be fttUy governed by his
own will and not that of another; governed by that conscience which would
operate equally and effectively in all men* This was, perhaps, Utopian. He
looked forward to the time in which all men would be virtuous; but, for the
present, reform of character and reform of government rather than its abolition
held the consequential priorities.* Thus he stated that "unlike those who
call themselves no-government men, I ask for, not at once no government, but
at once a better government."&
The achievements of the country, which were so often attributed to the
government, were, according to Thoreau, due to the character of the American
3Henry David Thoreau, "Civil Disobedience," Philosopher of Freedom, ed.
James MacKaye (Boston, 19310, p. 13lt. r '
P. Grimes, American Political Thought (New York, 1955), p. 207.
^Thoreau, op. cit.. p. 136.
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people, whose achievements might have been greater still if the government
had not interfered. "For government is an expedient by which men would
fain succeed in letting one another alone; and, as has been said, when it is
most expedient, the governed are most let alone by it."6 She good society,
as Thoreau saw it, was one in which each man might go his own way according
to the dictates of a universal conscience without any hindrance from any ex
ternal power.
Conscience rather than Statute was the Important standard of behavior
to Thoreau; for government founded on expediency was frequently given to inex
pedient actions. The fact that a statute had the sanction of the majority
of the community behind it did not make that statute a Just one. The sanc
tion behind majority rule was force of numbers, and sheer power had no cor
relation with justice. "It is not desirable to cultivate a respect for the
law," he believed, "so much as for the right. The only obligation which I
have a right to assume is to do at any time what I think is right."1
In Thoreau's opinion, nothing should stand in the way of a man's acting
in accordance with the compulsions of his own conscience. No considerations
of social position, no considerations of life or property, not even the
national existence of a State, should stand in the way of the dictates of
morality. Referring specifically to what he considered the current abuses,
Thoreau declared, "This people must cease to hold slaves, and to make war on
8
Mexico, though it cost them their existence as a people."
Thoreau, op. cit., p. 136.
TIbid., p. 137.
8Grimes, op. cit., p. 209.
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In an effort to abolish slavery and end the war with Mexico, Thoreau
proposed his technique for political action* He called upon the men of
Massachusetts to throw their whole weight, and not merely their vote, in
favor of eradication of these two evils* A vote was merely the expression
of a desire for a given course of action and thus was a relatively ineffectual
political device unless one were in the majority* But since rightfulness was
the important factor, the technique had to be one which the virtuous few
could use in spite of and against the less conscientious many* This technique
by which the right could bring the wrong into line, the few control the
many, he called "civil disobedience.'1 It amounted to the nonsupport of the
government* It was, he admitted, a form of rebellion, but it was also a
passive sort of revolution* It included refusal to pay taxes, jail-going or
refusal of any support whatever to the government, for in an unjust state the
only place for a just man is in jail* Superior morality would thus overcome
superior number*
I know this well, that if one thousand, if one hundred, if ten
men whom I could name,—if ten honest men only,--aye, if one
honest man, in this state of Massachusetts, ceasing to hold
slaves, were actually to withdraw from this co-partnership,
and be locked up in the county jail, therefore, it would be
the end of slavery in America*9
At first glance this political technique might seem unrealistic and
based on an overestimation of the place of morality in politics, or it might
seem that a prisoner's influence on the state is negligible* But Thoreau
answered that "truth is stronger than error*"10 Yet, it would seem that
°Thoreau, op* cit.« p* 137*
^Grimes, op. cit*, 210*
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Thoreau looked beyond the lone martyr suffering imprisonment because of moral
indignation* He envisaged a wider scope of civil disobedience, with more
participants included.11 For the solitary imprisonment of a single righteous
person might be followed by the nonparticipation, and perhaps imprisonment,
of all just men*
A minority is powerless while it conforms to the majority; it
is not even a minority then; but it is irresistible when it
clogs by its weight* If the alternative is to keep all just
men in prison, or give up war and slavery, the State will not
hesitate which to choose.12
Analysis and Criticism of Henry David Thoreau
It should be stated at the outset that Thoreau had no systematic theory
concerning civil disobedience* His views are fragmentary and sketchy* However,
he is significant because of his intense dislike of bad government and out
ward devotion to its correction. He expressed a great need for the institu
tion of civil disobedience in the face of adamance of the State* This is the
idea which will be examined here*
For Thoreau, civil disobedience amounted to passive resistance on the
part of the individuals who could no longer tolerate the decisions of their
government* This act, it seems, would appear to put private claims above
social claims, and private rights above social duties* Thoreau, however,
apparently saw no conflict between private rights and public duties unless
one side is in error* For in his Utopian view of the universe, harmonious
relations exist where all people act rightly* This is a symbolic interpreta
tion* Disharmony and conflict occurred only with the advent of evil, or bad
conscience, on the scene* Thus his plea for individual conscience was at once
*\horeau, op* cit*. p* 138.
^Crimes, op. cit,, p. 213*
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a plea for such a public conscience that evil and ignorance might be banished
and public duty would agree with private rights.1^ Farther, he assumed, all
individuals would agree on the specific requirements of their moral obliga
tions* Thoreau, in his opposition to social conformity, thus clearly assumed
an essential conformity of private conscience. He spoke for the minority of
one, as others in American thought voiced the claims of class and sectional
minorities* He emphasized the importance of the individual in society; he
disdained the use of overt force and sought, like Mahatraa Gandhi, in India
years later, civil disobedience as a means to give effect to moral values*
Nevertheless, according to Grimes, it does not appear that it ever occurred
to Thoreau that men might disagree on moral values without someone being
actually in the wrong,1**
Civil disobedience, a modified form of the right of revolution, raises
certain questions of expediency and morality* For with the just men non-co
operative and in the jails, and the unjust men on the outside running the
government, it might be questionable how much clogging of the machinery of
the government this minority could do* And Grimes further observed that the
clogging technique introduces an element of compulsion into political affairs
which puts force behind the lever of morality, or in fact, any other cause.1^
Essentially, therefore, Thoreau, opposed to compulsion, returned to this method
as a means of political action* Ihis may not be the same type of coercion,
but it shows that Thoreau was willing to utilize certain coercive elements
in order to achieve the ends he desired*




According to Grimes, Thoreau sought to penetrate beyond the outward
appearances of things and reach into the common conscience of mankind. That
there was such a conscience common to mankind he had no doubt; for it was
this conscience which set the proper standards in accordance with a universal
system of morality. AU things and persons were governed inexorably by laws
beyond the reach of men; it was the fundamental ordinances that demanded ad
herence in spite of the fancies of society or the decrees of majority rule.
Fundamentally, man»s being was in harmony with nature and his fellow man,
and one needs only to trust conscience as a guide to right and harmonious
conduct. Because the individual was of paramount concern, and the precepts
of right and wrong were known to aU men, man's basic right was to trust and
obey the dictates of his conscience. If his conscience ruled contrary to the
compulsions of society, then so much the error of society. This high con
ception of the dignity of the individual carried with it a rather low or at
least indifferent attitude toward the government.
This conception also raised pertinent questions, should an individual
break the laws of state because he thinks it is right to obey the dictates
of his conscience? What should be the answer if an individual is incapable
of sound reasoning and judgment, yet his conscience dictates against positive
law? John Dickinson disagrees with the right to disobey positive law merely
because an individual does not think it is right*
Shall we admit that because of the limitations and dangers of
positive law, freedom to break through at the will of the in
dividual who thinks himself right must be erected into a normal
working part of the system of government available at all -times,
rather than kept in reserve in the form of an extra-legal power
l6Ibid., p. 216.
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of revolution for use only as an abnormal safety-valve and
last resort in exceptional cases of great oppression*^7
Re further observest
There seems to be a search primarily for a way to regularize
and legalise disobedience to existing positive law* A law
which can be legally broken at the will of the lawbreaker can
never be positive law in any intelligible sense. The basic
question at stake in the controversy over disobedience is
therefore, what shall the attitude be toward breaches of the
positive laws.18
The validity of Thoreau's argument, it is important to remember, hinges
on the validity of at least two assumptions* The assumptions are, first,
that there are permanent and inalienable rights inherent in the very nature
of man and that obedience to one's conscience rather than positive law is
such a right; second, that man needs a better government because it is at
best but an expedient and does not serve the people, * On this point, it is
well to emphasize the fact that Ihoreau has been identified with anarchism
because of his views along the lines of abolishing bad government* He is
mentioned in Francis W. Coker's Recent Political Thought along with such
well-known anarchists as Josiah Warren, Stephen Pearl Andrews, Benjamin
20
Tucker and fysander Spooner of America.
It appears that the shifting of positions—from passive resistance to
active resistance in the John Brown incident—by Thoreau serves to shed some
light on the reasons why Thoreau never advanced a systematic theory on
17
John Dickinson, HA Working Theory of Sovereignty," Political Science
Quarterly, LEV (March, 19k&), 3$. ——.
^Ibid.
19
Thoreau, op* cit*, p* 158*
Coker, op. cit,, p, 197*
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political obligation. He advocated the use of the most expedient method
in subjecting the state to individual conscience* So, it is learned that
even though Thoreau was one of the first modern day exponents of civil dis
obedience utilizing the technique of nonviolence, he recognized that there
were situations that warranted the use of violence.
Political institutions, according to Thomas Hill Green, are to be judged
according to the development of the individual citizens.21 For a man to live
a life which he can call his own life, morally speaking, he must be able to
count on a certain freedom of action in the attainment of his aims* Ibis is
possible only where there is a common recognition, by members of the society
in which he lives, that such freedom is for their common good* This recog
nition is expressed in laws* So, when an individual submits to the authority
of the institutions through which laws are formulated and executed, he is
simply allowing his life to be regulated by conditions without which he
would be unable to live a life really his own. Thus, the function of law,
according to Thomas Hill Green, is to assist man "to realize his reason, i.e.,
his idea of self-perfection, by acting as a member of a social organization
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in which each contributes to the better being of all the rest." There must
be, Green continues, a feeling that the coercive authority holding them together
and controlling their common action exists for their good. It is, of course, true
that the supremacy of laws involves restraints upon individual inclinations.2^
Thomas Hill Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation,




^Coker, op. cit., p. Ij23.
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The Oxford idealist philosophy Justifies political compulsion and punish
ment. But an essential element of legal supremacy, as distinguished from mere
superior physical force, is a consciousness, on the part of the individuals
restrained, that submission to the restraints is for the common good.2** The
most liberal government, according to Henry S. Canby»s interpretation of
Thoreau, becomes a tyranny when it denies the right of the individual to be
responsible for his intellectual and moral integrity. It can overrule him,
yes, but he must somehow resist. If he is incapable of sound reasoning, an
opponent of order, which is essential to the State or if he is an egoist, he
will suffer. If, however, his integrity is based on values indispensable to
a self-respecting man, then resistance is also indispensable, and will become
apcner unconquerable in the long run, even by force,2^ From Canby's point
of view, there is a weakness in this argument. According to him, it leaves
one of those wide margins that Thoreau liked in his thinking, and this time
a margin of possible error. For if the individual is to determine his own
rights, what authority is left to distinguish between enlightened resistance
to a ruler and anarchy, which will inevitably dissolve the state itself?
Thoreau, Canby continues, would have answered that one must have faith in
man, one must believe that an intuition of what is necessary for survival is
a reality in human nature.26
But this was not the lesson which many have learned from "Civil Disobe
dience." The metaphysics of politics concerns them as little as it concerned
2l*Ibid.. p, itflu
-Henry Canby, Thoreau (Boston. 1939), p. 23$,
26Ibid., p. 236.
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Thoreau. The conflict of man against the State is real, no matter what one
thinks of its rules. It wanes, it waxes—there seems to be a possibility today
of having reached or nearing again one of its periodical ©rises.27 There will
probably always be those who are faced with the sacrifice either of their
just rights or their security. How can those who are determined to resist,
oppose, with any hope of success, a regime of such great force? Thoreau,
writing in an America soon to be In the throes of a great rebellion, was
not, it seems, thinking of mass rebellion where motives are mixed and the
objective is sometimes power. He was concerned, it appears, with the in
dividual whose power mostly lies in his integrity* For him he counsels
passive resistance.
Finally, Thoreau believed there will never be a really free and en
lightened State until the State comes to recognize the individual as a
higher and independent power, from which all its own power and authority are
derived, and treats him accordingly. And until such a State is realized, he
was ready to resist, when necessary, brute force. While he could not have
expected successfully to oppose the force itself, his resistance might have
been effective because it might have changed the minds of the men who exercised
the force. And, therefore, it would not have been futile quietly to declare
war upon the State.
History suggests that such disobedience can be effective. There is, perhaps,
no power in the world today able to overcome aerial bombs and machine guns
but intellectual and emotional resistance in Thoreau*s sense, by brave men,





In the face of a British-granted Constitution to India in 1919* the
apostles of swaraj found new inspiration in a new leader, Mohandas Gandhi,
who became known as Hahatma or "Holy Man11 who preached a strange gospel
derived from Henry David Thoreau, Tolstoi, Jesus of Nazareth and others.
His message came to this: love your enemies, resist not evil, eschew force,
oppose your oppressors with nonviolent civil disobedience* Physical force
is effective, according to Gandhi, only against those who oppose it with
physical force of a lesser nature. Against those who meet it with nonviolent
resistance, if they are numbered in millions and dedicated to a cause, force
is helpless.2 Gandhi cheerfully went in and out of jail, fasting and praying
and advising his followers to boycott British goods, return to the spinning
wheel and village handicrafts, practice asceticism, evade taxes, disobey laws
and submit meekly but proudly to beating, jail or death*
In India, under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, experiments (as
Gandhi called them) which had been first undertaken in South Africa were ex
tended beyond the individual protest* Later experiments conducted during the
struggle for Indian independence carried mass action beyond the confining limits
of civil disobedience* Out of these emerged a new technique which Gandhi
'''John Dickinson, "A Working Theory of Sovereignty,11 Political Science
Quarterly, LPT (March, 19U8), 36.




called SatyaFaha.3 gatyafiraha> ^ich was ^ ^ ^
word coined during the movement of Indian resistance in South Africa to the
Asiatic Law Amendment Ordinance intorduced into the Transvoal legislative
Council in 1906. Gandhi explained that he first called the movement ..passive
resistance," but as the struggle continued he became aware that «some new
principle had to come into bei*g." He then came upon the word "sadagraha,"
meaning "firmness in a good cause."
SYX ffiS? " ?ffc«* *»Uar represent the whole idea
Bsmgms^Bsuse or the phrase •passive resistance.
Satyafiraha embraced the method and the essential philosophy of civil
disobedience, but through its application and refinement it became a technique
for social and political change which transcended the substantial limitations
of the earlier concept. Gandhi's method became something more than a method
of resistance to particular legal norms. It became an instrument of struggle
for positive objectives and for fundamental change-a technique more widely
used than understood and one which yet called for testing in the field of
social and political action. When, in 19I&, Mahatma Gandhi died by an
assassin's bullet, the "experiments la truth," which he had begun, remained
far from complete.
It is evident, by the nature of the movement, that Gandhi's philosophy
Bondurant, Conquest of Violenea (Princeton, 1958), p. 10
**Cited in ibid., p.
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built on the good that he believed to be inherent in the nature of man*
His tactics were successful in that he achieved the ends which he sought*
He recognized that Satyagraha (soul-force) had an indeterminate possibility
for social progress*
One of the most potent legacies Qandhi left behind in India was the
technique of nonviolence through ahimsa. It is important at this point to
try to understand the origin of this technique and how it works. The word
ahimsa expresses an ancient Hindu, Jain, and Buddhist ethical precept*
The negative prefix "a" pins "hirasa" loosely meaning "injury" make up the
word which is usually translated as nonviolence* let, ahimsa is more than
a negative notion* As is characteristic of Hindu and Buddhist terminology,
the negative wording implies much which remains unexpressed* The full force
of ahimsa, explicitly stated, means "action based on the refusal to do harm."
Ahimsa, then, means renunciation of the will to kill or to damage* Gandhi
refined the meanings
Ahimsa is not the crude thing it has been made to appear* Not
io hurt any living thing is no doubt a part of ahimsa* But it
is its least expression* The principle of ahimsa is hurt by
evil thought, by undue haste, by lying, by Katrect, by wishing
ill to anybody*7
I accept the interpretation of ahimsa, namely that it is not
merely a negative state of harmless'ness but it is a positive
state of love, of doing good even to the evil-doer* But it
does not mean helping the evil doer to continue the wrong or
tolerating it by passive acquiescence. On the contrary, love,
the active state of ahimsa, requires you to resist the wrong
doer by dissociating yourself from him even though it may
offend him or injure him physically*9
6Ibid., p* 23.
7Mahatma Gandhi, Young India (New Iork, 1921*), p* 31.
8Ibid., p. 33.
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Expressed differently, nonviolence means that if one individual attacks
another with physical violence and the victim hits back, the violent response
gives the attacker a certain reassurance and moral support. It shows that
the victim*s scale of moral values in regard to violence as a mode of settling
questions is the same as that of the attacker, A mere display of either fear
or anger by the victim is sufficient to have this effect. It makes the
attacker sure of his choice of methods, of his knowledge of human nature and
hence of his opponent. The attacker»s morale is sustained, his sense of
values is vindicated. His confidence in his general trend of dealing with
his opponent is reassured.? On the other hand, suppose the assailant attacks,
with physical violence, a different sort of person. The attitude of this
new opponent is fearless, calm, steady, and because of a different belief,
training or experience, he has much self-control. He does not respond to
the attacker*s violence with counter-violence. Instead, he accepts the blows
with good-tempered reasoning, stating his belief as to the truth of the
matter in dispute, asking for an examination of both sides of the dispute,
and stating his readiness to abide by truth. He offers resistance but only
in moral terms. He states his readiness to prove his sincerity by his own
suffering rather than by imposing suffering on the assailant, through violence.
He accepts blow after blow, showing no signs of fear or shrinking or resent
ment, keeping steadily good-humored and kindly in look of eye, tone of voice,
and posture of body and arms. To violence, he opposes nonviolent resistance.10
Richard B. Gregg, The Power of Nonviolence (Hew York, 1951), pp.lil-
10Ibid.
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As to the outcome of a struggle waged by nonviolence, it is well to
understand one point thoroughly. The aim of nonviolence is not to injure,
or crush and humiliate the opponent, or to "break his wiUL" as in a violent
fight. The aim of the resister is to convert the opponent, to change his
understanding and his sense of values so that he will join in wholeheartedly
with the resister in seeking a settlement truly amicable and truly satisfying
to both sides. The nonviolent resister seeks a solution under which both
parties can have complete self-respect and mutual respectj a settlement that
will Implement the new desires and fun energies of both parties. The non
violent resister seeks to help the violent attacker to re-establish his
moral balance on a level higher and more secure than that from which he first
launched his violent attack. The method withdraws a mistaken support not in
order to harm the opponent but to help both parties into a more secure, creative,
happy and truthful relationship.11
Analysis and Criticism of Mahatma Gandhi
It has been stated that Gandhi, evidently, built his ideas on the good
which he believed to be inherent in the nature of man* His tactics, including
Satyagraha. aMmsa, fasting, and love facilitated nonviolence and perhaps
proved successful. He recognized that Satyagraha (soul-force) had indeter
minate possibility as an instrument of struggle for positive objectives and
for fundamental changes. Gandhi believed that no individual is intentionally
wicked, that there is no man who does not have the faculty to discriminate
between right and wrong, and that if that faculty were fully developed, it
would mature into nonviolence. He insisted that no man could remain an enemy
*. p.
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in the face of such a treatment and such spirit. The oppressor must ultimately
be absorbed by it and become a part of it,12 This technique could be deadly
if used against authorities who have very little ethical concern. Classic
examples are Hitler, Caesar, and Stalin, who showed respect only for physical
power of the same sort and amount as their own and held very little regard
for ethics except where it was beneficial to their own causes. To this,
Qandhi answered that the nonviolent soldier must have the capacity to bear
severe beatings, torture, mutilations, starvations and worse, and accept
these without anger and without fear of those vtoo oppress him,13 Further,
he might argue that his single victory in India is proof enough that non
violence, developed to greater perfection, could win greater victories
against greater armed forces*
According to C. F. Andrews, the last two encounters utilizing Satyagraha
and "non-co-operation,* owing to the violence «hich erupted, were premature
and the preparations which led up to them were incomplete.1*
In the great non-co-operation storm which swept across India from end to
end, in 1920-22, the very excitement that carried the movement forward was
its greatest danger. The poet Rabindranath Tagore, in this respect, became
the "Great Sentinel" on guard for the integrity of his country. He pointed
out that the blind following of any personality, however devotedly noble,
must, in the long run, lead to violence, and thus prove a failure when the
^2 ■
Gandhi, "I Still Believe in Nonviolence," op. cit., p, 17.
^Ibid., p. 18.
1U
George Orwell, "Notes on Gandhi," The Nation, XXXV (June, 1952), 31.
C. F. Andrews, Mahatma Qandhi* s Ideas (New lork, (n. d.) ), p. I9l».
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cause was being based on a purely moral foundation alone.16 Further, when
it is considered, even for a moment, the vast and detailed preparatory
training for military service which occupies many years of a man's lifetime
and with large numbers become a life profession, it should be abundantly clear
that the moral effect needed to supplant war cannot be made in an Impromptu
manner. It needs all the care and forethought of an earnestness no less
whole-hearted than that which is given to world-military endeavor.17
Throughout the Western world there are many voluntary organizations appealing
to different sides of the population, but what has not yet been found in the
West is a moral genius of such commanding spiritual personality as to be
able to unite and combine these various organised efforts into one over
whelming movement of non-violence which should be strong enough to sweep
away, on a tide of world approval, the opposing forces.
Critical analysis reveals many questionable facets of Gandhi's doctrine.
For example, is force always wrong? If violence is always wrong, wherein
lies the blame when nonviolence provokes violence? Is love, or moral good
will as it was expressed by Gandhi, sufficient or powerful enough to move
ruling classes, or must there be ottier forms of power to achieve this end?
Remember, love for Gandhi involved freedom from personal resentment and »
moral purpose, free of selfish ambitions. Or again, is creative suffering
a mover of evil? The first question prompts another question from Dr. Howard
Zinn. Would it have been wrong to assassinate Hitler at that point in the
war when this might have brought a halt to general hostilities and to the




extermination of the Jews?18 On the second question, the "Freedom Riders"
behaved nonviolently, but their action did bring violence against themselves,
and against others* Nonviolence theorists will insist that the responsibility
for the violence rests with those who committed it. But this dodges the
question* The fact is that there was more violence in the world after the
"Freedom Riders" began their rides than before. The "Freedom Riders" pro
voked the violence, but with the good intention of testing and striking down
unjust laws* And for this the obvious justification, according to Dr. Zinn,
is that the amount of violence was insignificant compared to the amount of
19
justice won*
Certain limitations are naturally imposed upon Gandhi* s philosophy* &
memorable example of one limitation was the famed "Himalayan Blunder," where
Gandhi was unable to restrain his own excited crowd when violence erupted.
It was a day of fury* It resulted in the death of one British official and
a British policeman* Jfeny of Gandhi»s followers died*2O it is further con
ceivable that if authorities are sufficiently brutal, they can exterminate
nonviolent resisters without experiencing that moral repugnance from their
acts which paralyzed the British in India*21
During the Second World War disciples of Gandhi would lie down on the
railroads and refuse to move. English drivers would not run over such men,
and the result was that railway traffic was paralyzed. it is inconceivable
l8Howard Zinn, "The Force of Nonviolence," The Nation, March 17, 1962, p. 21
200rwell, pjojjett*, p* 31*




to this writer that if the drivers had been Nazis and the men on the rails
Jews, the result would have been the same. But in the circumstances with
which Gandhi had to deal, his method was capable of bringing success that
probably no other method would have brought.
According to Reinhold Niebuhr, nonviolence and violence produce conse
quences not totally dissimilar. The distinguishing marks of violent coercion
and conflict are usually held to be the intent to destroy either life or
property. This distinction is correct if consequences are not confused with
intent. Nonviolent conflict and coercion may also result in the destruction
of life or property.23 The difference is that destruction is not the intended
but the inevitable consequence of nonviolence coercion. The chief difference
between violence and nonviolence is not, according to Niebuhr, in the degree
of destruetion which they cause, though the difference is usually considerable,
but in the aggressive character of the one and the negative character of the
other.21*
Nonviolence, while it represents a passive and negative form of resistance,
may have very positive consequences* It certainly places restraints upon the
freedom of the objects of its discipline and prevents them from doing what
they desire to do* Furthermore, Niebuhr states that it destroys property
values, and it may destroy life; though it is not generally as destructive
of life as violence* Yet a boycott, Niebuhr continues, may rob a whole
comirswity of its livelihood and, if maintained long enough, it will certainly
^Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society (New York, 1932),
p* ZZjO* —■■■■■ »___
2l*ibid., p. 21a.
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destroy life. A strike may destroy the property values inherent in the in
dustrial process which it brings to a halt, and it may imperil the life of
a whole community which depends upon sons vital service with which the
strike interferes*2* Nor can it be maintained that it isolates the guilty
from the innocent more successfully than violent coercion* The innocent are
involved with the guilty in conflicts between groups, not because of any
particular type of coercion used in the conflict but by the very group
character of the conflict. No community can be disciplined without affecting
all its members who are dependent upon, even though they are not responsible
for its policies. The cotton spinners of Lancashire, England were impoverished
by Gandhi13 boycott of English cotton, though they can hardly be regarded as
the authors of British imperialism*
Nonviolence, which is essentially non-co-operation with the oppressor,
according to Niebuhr, results in social consequences not totally dissimilar
from those of violence.26 The differences are very important; but before
considering them it is necessary to emphasize the similarities and to insist
that nonviolence does coerce and destroy* !Ehe more intricate and interde
pendent a social process in which non-co-operation is used, the greater the
chances are for coercion and destruction* Examples of this may be found in
the Montgomery and Albany movements. This insistence is important because
non-resistance, as Niebuhr sees it, is so frequently confused with nonviolent
resistance. Mr. Gandhi, the greatest modern exponent of nonviolence, has




as the use of "soul-force" or "truth-force." He regarded it as spiritual in
contradistinction to the physical character of violence* Very early in his
development of the technique of nonviolence in South Africa he declared:
"Passive resistance is a misnomer•••♦The idea is more completely expressed
by the term 'soul-force.1 Active resistance is better expressed by the
28
term »body-force»*"
A negative form of resistance is not regarded a spiritual simply because
it is negative. As long as it enters the field of social and physical re
lations and places physical restraints upon the desires and activities of
others, it is a form of physical coercion* Niebuhr further finds the con*
fusion in Gandhi's mind interesting, because it seems to arise from his
unwillingness, or perhaps his inability, to recognise the qualifying influences
of his political responsibilities upon the purity of his original ethical
and religious ideals of nonresistanee.
Beginning with the idea that social injustice could be resisted by
purely ethical, rational and emotional forces (truth-force and soul-force
in the narrower sense of the term), he came finally to realize the necessity
of some type of physical coercion upon the foes of his people's freedom,
as every political leader must.29 "In my humble opinion," Gandhi declared,
"the ordinary methods of agitation by way of petitions, deputations, and the
like is no longer a remedy for moving to repentance a government so hopelessly
indifferent to the welfare of its charge as the Government of India has proved
28Cited in ibid., p. 21*2.
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to be,"3° an indictment and an observation which could probably be made
with equal validity against and about any imperial government of history*
In spite of his use of various forms of negative physical resistance, civil
disobedience, boycotts and strikes, he seems to have persisted in giving
them a connotation which really belongs to pure non-resistance by giving
them spiritual distinction* "Jesus Christ, Daniel, and Socrates represent
the purest form of passive resistance or soul force," he declared in a
passage in which he explains the meaning of what is most undeniably non
violent resistance rather than non-resistance.^1 All this is a pardonable
confusion in the soul of a man who was trying to harmonize the insights of
a saint with the necessities of statecraft, a very difficult achievement*
But it is nevertheless a confusion thereby revealing the inconsistencies
in the philosophy*
The use of truth-force or soul-force, in the purer and more exact
meaning of those words, means an appeal to the reason and goodwill of an
opponent in a social struggle* This may be regarded as a type of resistance,
but it is not physical coercion* Niebuhr places it in the realm of eduea-
tion* It places no external restraints upon the object of its discipline*
It may avail itself of a very vivid and dramatic method of education* It
may dramatize the suffering of the oppressed, as for instance Gandhi's
encouragement of his followers to endure the penalties of their civil
disobedience "long enough to appeal to the sympathetic chord in the governors
30Ibid.
F. Andrews, op. cit., p. 238.
3 Niebuhr, opjcit,, p* 21*3*
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and the lawmakers.* But it is still education and not coercion. It must
be recognized, of course, that education may contain coercive elements.
Gandhi's designation of nonviolence and non-co-operation as »soul-foree»
is less confusing and more Justified when this emphasis upon nonviolence
of spirit is considered. Nonviolence, for him, has really become a term
by which he expresses the ideal of love, the spirit of moral goodwill.
This involves, for Mm, freedom from personal resentments. It also entails
moral purpose, free of selfish ambitions. It is the temper and spirit in
which a political policy is conducted, which he is really designating, rather
than a particular political technique.33
Despite the inconsistencies revealed by this analysis, the method of
nonviolence as advanced by Mahatma Gandhi yields very important advantages
in social conflict. Nonviolent coercion offers the largest opportunities
for a harmonious relationship with the moral and rational factors in social
life. It does not destroy the process of a moral and rational adjustment
of interest to interest completely during the course of resistance. Resis
tance of self-assertion easily makes self-assertion more stubborn, and
conflict arouses dormant passions which completely obscure the real issues
of a conflict. Nonviolence reduces these dangers to a minimum. It preserves
moral, rational and co-operative attitudes within an area of conflict and
thus augments the moral forces without destroying them. Thus, the virtues
of nonviolent resistance.
Gandhi«s use of ahimsa was convenient, but there are pertinent questions
to be asked about the technique. It is understood that ahimsa requires de
liberate self-suffering, not a deliberate injuring of the supposed wrong-
p.
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doer. In its positive form, ahimsa means the largest love, the greatest
charity* But does this mean that any man can achieve this type of love?
What is the criterion by which this technique is judged the highest possible
achievement of love? Is there nothing above this achievement? How is it
possible for a human being to achieve this type of love when his culture
has taught against the very principles upon which this love is built, such
as self-suffering, love thy neighbor, etc. In order for this to be true
it would mean that the men concerned must become spiritual. Reinhold Niebuhr
declares that all men cannot be expected to become spiritual any more than
they can be expected to become rational.3** The weakness of the spirit of
love in solving larger and more complex problems becomes increasingly
apparent as one proceeds from ordinary relations between individuals to
the life of social groups* If this is true, how then, can love be able to
move ruling classes from power? These are questions which when leveled at
Gandhi's techniques and philosophy, find that they are lacking*
3**Ibid. P. 73.
CHAPTER IV
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
Today, on the American scene, there is great internal strife* Not
only are individuals being interrogated against their will by the national
government, as pointed oat by David Spitz in his revealing article, "Democracy
and the Problem of Civil Disobedience,"1 but there exists a frightening and
sometimes tragic discord in the social order. The great problem evolves
around what Ronald J. Rousseve termed "discord among brown and white* »2 In
more harsh terminology, it is the sometimes bitter, sometimes brutal, and
even deadly encounter between the white man and the black man. Out of
this spiraling web of bitterness and hatred arose a fearless champion of
freedom and human dignity, Martin lather King, Jr. Hearing the deep rumble
of discontent beneath the surface of the people's troubled exterior
appearances, and sensing the ripeness of the times, he launched his "erusade
without violence." Dr. King's movement closely resembles that of Mahatma
Gandhi in his struggle with Great Britain—in that Ma weapons include non
violence, love, people, money, organization, publicity and boycotts. Before
an Institute on Nonviolence at Montgomery, Alabama, in 1956, he made the
following ringing statementst
A great challenge that stands before us is that of entering the
new age with understanding goodwill. This simply means that
the Christian virtues of love, mercy and forgiveness should
„,« d1??^ ?Pi*?' MDemoepacy a»d the Problem of Civil Disobedience," Ameri
can Political Science Review. XLVII (April, 19$h), 2078. &Sm~A
Ronald J. Rousseve, Discord in Brown and White (New York, 1962), p# 10.
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stand at the center of our lives. There is danger that those
of us who have lived so long under the yoke of oppression,
those of us who have been exploited and trampled over, those of
us who have had to stand amid the tragic midnight of injustice
and indignities will enter the new age with hate and bitterness,
but if we retaliate with hatred and bitterness, the new age will
be nothing but a duplication of the old age* We must blot out
the hate and injustice of the old age with love and justice of
the new* This is why I believe so firmly in nonviolence* Vio
lence never solves a problem* It only creates new and more
complicated ones* If we succumb to the temptations of using
violence in our struggle for justice, unborn generations will
be the recipients of a long and desolate night of bitterness,
and our legacy to the future will be an endless reign of
meaningless chaos* •*
In his remarkable book, Stride Toward Freedom, the Gandhi disciple and
interpreter sought to clarify his position and define the terms "love" and
Agape as used in his context* He listed three types of love which are
philia, eros and agape* Agape is the term that is subjected to examination
here* First what is agape? The Greek language speaks of it as the highest
level of love* According to Dr. King, agape means nothing sentimental or
basically affectionate* It means understanding, redeeming goodwill for aU
men* It is an overflowing love which asks nothing in return* It is the
love of God working in the lives of men* When one rises to love on the
agape level, he loves men not because he likes them, not because their at*
titudes and ways appeal to him, but because God loves him* Here, one rises
to the position of loving the person who does evil while hating the deed
that the person does* With this type of love and understanding goodwill
one will be able to stand amid the radiant glow of the new age with dignity
and discipline*
%artin Imther King, Jr», "Facing the Challenge of a New Age," Phylon«
mi (December, 1957), 29.
W-tin lather King, Jr., Stride Toward Freedom (New York, I960), p*
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Agapei then, is disinterested love* It is love in which the individual
seeks not his own good, bat the good of his neighbor (I Cor* 10i2it)« Agape
does not begin by discriminating between worthy and unworthy people, or any
qualities people possess. It begins by loving others for their sake. It
is an entirely "neighbor-regarding concern for others," which discovers the
neighbor in every person it meets* Therefore, agape makes no distinction
between friend and enemy; it is directed toward both.'
The phrase "passive resistance11 often gives the false impression, ac
cording to Dr. King, that it is a sort of "do-nothing" method in which the
resister quietly and passively accepts evil* But nothing is further from
the truth. For, while the nonviolent resister is passive in the sense that
he is not physically aggressive toward his opponent, his mind and emotions
are always active, constantly seeking to persuade his opponent that he is
wrong* The method is passive physically, but strongly active spiritually*
It is not passive non-resistance to evil, it is active nonviolent resistance
to evil.6
A second basic fact that characterizes nonviolence is that it does not
seek to humiliate or defeat the opponent, but to win his friendship and
understanding.7 A third characteristic of this method is that the attack is
directed against forces of evil rather than against the person who happens
to be doing the evil* It is evil that nonviolence seeks to defeat, not the




suffering without retaliation, to accept blows from the opponent without
o
striking back.
Dr. King believes that man is an end because he is a child of God* Man
is not made for the state} the state is made for man. To deprive man of his
freedom is to relegate him to the status of a thing, rather than elevate him
to the status of a person. Man, according to Dr. King in his Stride Toward
Freedom, must never be treated as a means to the end of the state, but always
10
as an end within himself*
The implications are clear that whenever the State attempts to use in
dividuals as means, then the reply should be nonviolent or passive resistance.
This brings in the idea of just and unjust laws, and the difference between
them. Dr. King sees a just law as a law which squares with that which is
right. Any law that uplifts human personality is just* Whereas that law
which is out of harmony with that which is moral is a law which does not
square with the moral law of the universe. It does not square with the law
of God, so for that reason it is unjust* Any law that degrades the human
personality is unjust law, according to Dr. King. Further explanation
finds that Dr. King's interpretation of unjust law is a code that the
majority inflicts on the minority that which is not binding on itself.
So that this becomes difference made legal. Another thing that one can
say is that an unjust law is a code which the majority inflicts upon the
9Ibid.
10Ibid.
1%artin Iaxther King, Jr., "Love, Law and Civil Disobedience," New South,
XVI (December, 1961), 7*
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minority, which that minority had no part in enacting or creating, because
that minority had no right to vote in many instances, so that the legislative
bodies that made these laws were not democratically elected.12
Just law, says Dr. King, is just the opposite of what has been noted
concerning unjust law. A just law is a code that the majority, who happen
to believe in that code, compel the minority, who does not believe in it,
to follow, because it is willing to abide by the law. Therefore, the in
dividuals who stand upon the basis of civil disobedience realize that they
are following something that says that there are just laws and there are
unjust laws.1^ Dr. King does not can these individuals anarchists because,
in bis wordss
They believe that there are laws which must be followed; they
do not seek to defy law, they do not seek to evade the law.
For many individuals who would call themselves segregationists
and who would hold on to segregation at any cost seek to defy
the law; tn®y seek to evade the law and their process can lead
to anarchy. They seek in the final analysis to follow a way
of uncivil disobedience, not civil disobedience. And I submit
that the individual who disobeys the law, whose conscience
tells him it is unjust and who is willing to accept the penalty
by staying in jail until that law is altered, is expressing at
that moment the very highest respect for law.15
The nonviolent doctrine, in aotion, seeks to do a number of thingst
(1) defeat the unjust system, rather than individuals who are caught in that
system and misguided toward wrong; (2) make suffering a virtue; (3) build-up
the amazing potential for goodness that is believed to be inherent in human





the absence of tension) and ($) to achieve each of these virtuous things
through love and self-suffering*
Analysis and Criticism of Dr. Martin lather King, Jr.
It is important at this point, after reviewing the ideas and nonvio
lent method of Dr. Martin Lather King, Jr., to examine them to determine
their virtues and defects* First, it is essential to examine the concept of
love as used by Dr. King* The type of love which he advocates is agape.
The Greek language speaks of it as the highest level of love* Several
questions are pertinent concerning the attainment of this love and its
value to the nonviolent method* The question which is relevant here is,
what are the criteria by which this love is judged as the highest level of
love when applied to historical settings, and are they valid? Reinhold
Nlebuhr reveals, in his The Nature and Destiny of Man, that the final
majesty, the ultimate freedom, and the perfect disinterestedness of the
divine love can have a counterpart in history only in a life which ends
tragically because it refuses to participate in the claims and counterclaims
of historical existence* It portrays a love "which seeketh not its own***
But a love which seeketh not its own is not able to maintain itself in
historical society. Hot only may it fall victim to excessive forms of the
self-assertion of others, but even the most perfectly balanced system of
justice in history is a balance of competing wills and interests, and may
l5Ibid., p. U.
Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. I (2 volss New
York, 19U9), p. 73.
therefore destroy anything which does not participate in the balance."
Dr. King stated that it is hard to like a person who is inflicting
pain upon one, yet one must love the person who inflicts pain upon him.
Dr. King believes that one is able to love a person while hating the deeds
of the person. But can a person be separated from bis deeds? What about
incorrigibles? If man is to be separated from his evil deeds, who, then,
is responsible for the advent of evil in the first place? Is society to
blame for man's every act that is evil? Or again, who receives credit for
a deed that is considered good? If the premise that society is responsible
for evil deeds of man is allowed, then Adolph Eichmann was not guilty, but
the whole society of which he was a product.
If agage is the type of love which Niebuhr claims-that is, nonresistant,
non-assertive, disinterested and above historical setting,18 is it capable
of achieving the goal that Dr. King has set for it? Even if it is to be
used only to create the change of heart that Dr. King hopes for, it seems
that there is a form of resistance against that capacity for evil which
Dr. King admits in man. If there is resistance then, can this be the agape
symbolised by the Cross? In other words, would agape, alone be able to change
laws and the actions of men? Is ordinary mortal man capable of achieving
the agape level of love with his egoism? Egoism, it seems, is a form of
self-assertion which is considered a form of resistance. The weakness of
the spirit of love in solving larger and more complex problems becomes
increasingly apparent as one proceeds from ordinary relations between indi-
17Ibid,
p.
viduals to the life of social groups. If social groups find it hard to
approximate the principles of justice, it seems that they are even less
capable of achieving the agape principle of love* which demands more than
justice.W
It is impossible, according to Niebuhr, to symbolize the divine goodness
in history in any other way than by complete powerlessness, or rather by a
consistent refusal to use power in the rivalries of history. For there is
no self in history or society, no matter how Important its perspective upon
the competitions of life, which can rise to the position of disinterested
participation in those rivalries and competition,^0 It can symbolize disin
terested love only by a refusal to participate in the rivalries. Any parti
cipation in them means the assertion of one's ego interest against another.
For this reason the ethics of nonviolence as taught in the Sermon on the
Mount is in perfectly consistent relation with the love symbolized in the
21
Cross. If this revelation of agape by Niebuhr is true, then does it not
make invalid the use of agape in the sense that Dr. Sing is using it? Is
not the use of mass sit-in demonstrations, boycotts, pickets, and pilgrimages
a way of weilding power in striking back at the oppressor. Moreover, agape
22
means overflowing love which asks nothing in return, but Dr. King does seek
something in return. He seeks justice.
According to Niebuhr, the Cross symbolizes the perfection of agape which
20Ibid.
21Richard 6. Gregg, The Power of Nonviolence (New York, 1951), p. 33*
"King, Stride Toward Freedom, op. cit., p. 101*.
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transcends all particular norms of justice and mutuality in history* It rises
above history and seeks conformity to the Divine love rather than harmony
with other human interests and vitalities* This harmony is a desirable end
of historical striving; but it can never be a final norm contends Niebuhr.
For sinful egoism makes all historical harmonies of interest partial and in
complete j and a life which accepts these harmonies as final is bound to in
troduce sinful self-assertion into the ethical norm.
Dr. King evidently believes that love, which he calls understanding,
redemptive,, and creative goodwill for all men, has an overwhelming attrac
tion to that "something" within human nature which responds to goodness.2**
Recognizing the fact that man has the capacity to be evil as well as good,
Dr. King says that, wa Jesus of Nazareth or a Mahatma Gandhi can appeal to
that element of goodness within human beings, and a Hitler can appeal to
the element of evil within them. ' However, this seems to over simplify the
situation* There is no significant amount of evidence supporting the idea
that love has produced social justice in any great quantity* It is difficult
to conceive of the worst segregationist becoming an integrationist solely on
the basis of love* Evidence seemingly supports the contention that boycotts,
court action and economic strangulation, as was the case in Montgomery,
Alabama during the bos boycott, have been deciding factors. Thus, it appears
that the power of boycotts, court action, pickets and economic strangulation
which are physical in nature, not love, are the actual forceful instruments
2%iebuhr, op. cit., p. 7U*
2k
"King, "Love, Law and Civil Disobedience,'1 op. cit., p. 6*
p» 7.
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which have been effective in the achievement of social justice.
Another idea worthy of examination is Dr. King*3 concept of civil dis
obedience. Dr. Sing states that the passive resistance technique is passive
physically, but strongly active spiritually. Yet, he utilises boycotts,
sit-in demonstrations and pickets which are clearly physical forces without
which his techniques of love and nonviolence would perhaps be ineffective*
A second characteristic of nonviolence that is confusing is that it does
not seek to humiliate or defeat the opponent but to win his friendship and
understanding. The system is what is to be defeated, according to Dr. King.2^
But does the system not consist of the very opponents that he professes not
to humiliate or defeat? Who makes up the system and enacts the unjust laws
that Dr. King is crusading to defeat? How can the opponents be separated
from the evil system and the laws of which they are the creators? So, it
seems that if the system is destroyed, the creators and manipulators are
destroyed or at least defeated in the process.
The fourth principle is the willingness to accept suffering without re
taliation, to accept blows without striking back.26 Again, the use of demon
strations in various forms comes to mind* Is not the use of these demonstra
tions a form of retaliation or a striking force identified in the interest
of justice?
Dr. King's concept of nonviolence is interesting because, as in Gandhi's





character of violence, while he uses panels, committees, sit-in demonstra
tions, boycotts and pickets to achieve the ends desired. Observe the Mont
gomery and Albany incidents. There has been at least one outburst of violence
during each nonviolent campaign* Illustrative examples are the incidents of
July 23, in Albany, Georgia and the bloody day of infamy at Montgomery, Ala
bama's Greyhound Bus Terminal vhere several bus passengers called "Freedom
Riders" were brutally beaten and one Justice Department official of the
29
United States Government received a severe head injury*
Reinhold Niebuhr says that there is no absolute distinction between
violent and nonviolent coercion* The distinguishing marks of violence and
conflict are usually held to be the intent to destroy either life or pro
perly* This distinction is correct, he believes, if consequences are not
30
confused with intent* Nonviolent conflict and coercion may also result
in the destruction of property and even life as has been witnessed in the
Amiston, Alabama, and Montgomery, Alabama, incidents* The difference is
that destruction is not intended but possible consequence of nonviolent
coercion* The chief difference between violence and nonviolence is not in
the degree of destruction which they cause, though the difference is usually
considerable, Niebuhr says, but in the aggressive character of one and the
negative character of the other**
writer witnessed the Montgomery incident and gave refuge to those
who were fortunate enough to escape injury by retreating to the U* S* Post
Office Building which is adjacent to the bus terminal* The "Freedom Riders"
were given refuge at Radio Station WSMA where the writer was employed at the
time*
3"Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society (New York, 1932), p* 2U0.
31Ibid.
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There are certain other possible defects which have been detected in the
nonviolent resistance technique. Several people have questioned the principles
of nonviolence and the attainment of complete integration and justice through
its methodology. A man like Samuel DuBois Cook contends that nonviolence is
a myth, and with George Sorel, in Reflection on Violence, he believes that
men are moved by myths and that all movements of a social nature are built
on myths which affect the emotions of people and bring about social change.
Further, Cook points out the danger in dealing with nonviolence as the tendency
to absolutize it, thereby placing nothing higher. He submits that there is
a higher goal, the attainment of justice.32 And it is sensible to believe
that justice cannot always be attained through nonviolent means. Sometimes
the failure to use a measure of violence may make inevitable a far greater
injustice and violence.33 Failure to stop Hitler and Mussolini could have
had a definitely different effect on history. Could love and nonviolent
resistance have changed the minds of these two men who were so obsessed
with the "might is right" idea? These leaders apparently respected only
physical power of the same sort as they were capable of wielding.
These types of situations prompt the question, is violence or force always
wrong? The absolutism of some of the nonviolence spokesmen, according to Dr.
Howard Zian of Spelman College, weakens their position because people know,
deep down inside, even if they cannot articulate the reasons, that there
are times when violence is justifiable. For nonviolence seen as an absolute
32samuel D. Cook, "The Syndicalists," (Lecture delivered to class in
Political Science, Atlanta University, Atlanta, Georgia, May 1, 1962).
33Howard Zinn, "The Force of Nonviolence," The Nation, March 17, 1962,
p. 57.
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pacifism is only one of a pair of linked values which humanitarian people
share—peace and social justice. The desirability of one must constantly be
weighed against the other. * Dr. King fails, unlike Gandhi, to admit that
violence is sometimes necessary, but he admits that both nonviolence and
violence agree that suffering can be a very great social force. Violence,
Dr. King did not accept on the ground that it inflicts suffering on others.3*
Mahatma Gandhi, the Indian leader, of which Dr. King is a disciple finally
realized the necessity of some type of physical coercion upon the foes of
his people's freedom, »In my humble opinion," he declared, "the ordinary
methods of agitation by way of petitions, deputations, and the like is no
longer a remedy for moving to repentance a government so hopelessly indif
ferent to the welfare of its charge as the Government of India has proved
36
to be,1* an indictment and an observation which could probably be made with
equal validity against and about any imperial government of history* It
should be remembered that justice can be achieved in America through court
action and other media.
It should be remembered that the idea of civil disobedience is the
essence of Dr. Martin Luther King»s philosophy. It is important, at this
point, to consider his concepts and criteria of just law. In his article,
wLove, Law and Civil Disobedience,'* which appeared in the December, 1961,
issue of New South, he recognized the significance of, and who determines the
difference between a just and an unjust law. He offered the explanation that
%ing, »Love, Law and Civil Disobedience," op. cit.. p. 6.
36
C. P. Andrews, Mahatma Gandhi's Ideas (New York, (n.d.)), p. 238.
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"a just law is a law that squares with a moral law. It is a law that squares
with that which is right, so that any law that uplifts human personality is
a just law. Whereas that law which is out of harmony with the moral is a
law which does not square with the law of God, so for that reason it is un
just and any law that degrades the human personality is an unjust law*"37
Further, Dr. King reveals that, "the individuals who stand up on the
basis of civil disobedience realize that they are following something that
says that there are just and there are unjust laws. Now they are not
anarchists. They believe that there are laws which must be followed} they
do not seek to defy the law, they do not seek to evade the law.«38
The most confusing facet of Dr. Kingts idea of law is his formulation
of criteria by whieh to judge it. He states that a just law must square
with that which is right. Who can Judge what is right and criteria are to
be used to judge it? A law is unjust which does not square with the law of
God. What is the law of God and who judges it? If the individual is to
determine what laws are just and unjust and what form of disobedience to
such laws, what authority is left to distinguish between enlightened resis
tance to the rulers of the State and anarchy, which is the inevitable outcome
of such a situation? Dr. King claims the universal law and God as the sources
of his criteria. Is it so simple to claim universal law and God as the
sources of valid criteria by which to judge unjust law? It seems that natural
law is useful because it has been set up as a norm of what should be. It does
not seem to be a valid source because each person who makes claims always
•"King, "Love, Law and Civil Disobedience, w op, cit.. p. 7.
3%bid., p. 8.
39IMd., p. 7,
has interpretations of those claims and each person who claims natural rights
almost always has different reasons*
Should a man break the laws of State under any circumstance? This is
the perennial question to which Dr. King answers "yes" if the laws do not
square with right. This is what seems to be a circular argument* Who is
to determine that which is right against that which is not right and in
whose interest is either decision? Does not the State think that it is right?
Is it not possible that both interpretations of just law could be wrong or
at least inadequate? There are many interpretations of the law of God*
Therefore, there are many ideas which are not in harmony with Dr. King's
concepts* In the face of these differences, Dr. ling seems to make his
applications too easily* He seems to oversimplify the situation, which is
not very convincing* Moreover, it is a very difficult task to formulate
criteria for judging just law*
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
An analysis of the problem of civil disobedience in contemporary-
democratic thought reveals that there exists a seemingly irreconcilable
conflict between individual freedom and political authority. In an effort
to gain relief from the overpowering state, some men have devised ways
and means of escape. The most familiar and possibly the widest practiced
technique is nonviolent resistance, which had its roots deep in the annals
of history* This technique, in some form, is present in each of the
philosophies analyzed in this paper. The three major philosophies utilize
the nonviolence technique* They are grounded in the assumptions that the
government, in principle or practice, is unjust and therefore, the citizen
has a right to disobey Its laws* Moreover, there are certain inalienable
rights of man and the right to obey the dictates of his conscience over
positive law is such a right.
The following conclusions are drawn from an analysis of the problem
of civil disobedience in contemporary democratic thought* (1) Nonviolence
as advocated by Henry David Thoreau does not appear to have been the same
as the type used by recent exponents, Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther
King, Jr. To Thoreau, nonviolent resistance seems to have meant the refusal
to support the government in any way* He preached against what he called
bad government and refused to pay taxes because the government used the
money to support slavery which he thought was evil. On the other hand,
nonviolent resistance to Gandhi and King meant a resistance to evil through
$3
5U
self-suffering and love which was overflowing and embraced moral goodwill
and charity; (2) Each of the contemporary philosophies appears to be sketchy
and fragmentary* They seem to lack systematic order, therefore, they are
not completely convincing; (3) The chief difference between violence and
nonviolence is, perhaps, not in the degree of destruction which they cause,
but in the aggressive character of violence and the negative character in
nonviolence; (U) Nonviolence is capable of producing ends not totally dis
similar from those of violence* Observe the Albany and Montgomery incidents;
(5) Love as advocated by Gandhi and Dr* King is, seemingly, strongly effec
tive as a cohesive element—that is, it facilitates the nonviolence myth
which moves people emotionally and solicits their support in the name of
God. But it must be aided by other powerful physical forces, such as court
orders, boycotts, sit-in demonstrations and pickets, in the task of actually
removing laws and hindrances which are obstructing the path of justice; (6)
The Agape level of love, as referred to by Dr* King, is perfectly disinterested,
non-assertive and non-resistant, according to Reinhold Niebuhr. Therefore,
it is improbable that ordinary mortal man, with his egoism, can achieve,
with any degree of certainty, this level of love. Furthermore, there is a
seemingly constant struggle for justice and self-realization between men*
2
Moreover, this love is, according to Niebuhr, above and beyond the historical
setting and it can only be achieved by a refusal to participate in the con*
flicting struggles of history; (7) Neither of the doctrines of nonviolence,
^Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man (rev. ed.j New York,
, P. 73. '
2Ibid., p.
appears to have valid criteria for judging "soul force," ahimsa, or Agape
as norms of actions (8) Court action, not love, has caused the nonviolence
movement to be successful in removing unconstitutional laws*
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